Experiences With Regulatory Changes Of The Taxi Industry by Bekken, Jon-Terje
 
 
Experiences with regulatory changes in the taxi industry 1 
 
 
9TH CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION AND 
OWNERSHIP IN LAND TRANSPORT 
EXPERIENCES WITH REGULATORY 
CHANGES OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY 
Jon-Terje Bekken, Institute of Transport Economics, Norway  
INTRODUCTION 
The taxi industry remains one of the few industries where quantities and fares are still 
regulated to a great extent. International comparisons however, show a great diversity when it 
comes to regulation of the industry both to differences between countries as well as 
differences within countries. The diversity also inflicts on the approach to and outcome e of 
regulatory changes. 
 
This paper focuses on experiences with regulatory changes in the taxi industry. However, to 
understand the outcome it is also necessary to present the variety of regulatory approaches in 
the field. Thus, a brief presentation of this will also be made. The experiences will be 
compared to each other and discussed. The focus will be on European experiences. However, 
some references are also made to US and New Zealand experiences. The approaches are 
compared to each other and discussed in relation to supply, fares, quality of service and 
efficiency and effectiveness of administration and institutional structures.  
 
The paper based on a number of studies carried out by the Institute of Transport Economics 
since 2003. The studies have been commissioned by the International Road transport Union 
(IRU) (Bekken 2003), the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (Bekken and Longva 2003), the 
Norwegian Taxi Owners Association (Bekken 2003) and the Irish Taxi Regulator Bekken and 
Steen 2005). The studies have covered a vide range of topics in the field of taxi organisation 
and regulation. Synthesis of the findings has been summarized in Bekken (2005) and Bekken 
and Longva (2004). 
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The description of the regulatory regimes in the paper is based on information collected from 
different cities and countries and on interviews with representatives from the industry. To 
some extent different authorities have also provided information. When it comes to 
evaluations of experiences with deregulation, I have relied on a number of secondary sources. 
Unfortunately, reasons for and against regulation are often coloured by general political views 
on the role of government. This has also influenced much of the literature on taxi regulation.  
To make theories more powerful, they should be based on empirical findings. Unfortunately, 
such empirical studies of the taxi industry are scarce. One reason for this may be that it is 
difficult to obtain the necessary information.  
 
The paper starts by putting regulatory approaches into a conceptual framework to clarify the 
differences between regulatory approaches and also to point out some important market 
characteristics. The taxi industry isn’t a homogeneous market. Rather, it is made up of 
different segments that to some extent may require different approaches. After having 
described the existing regulatory approaches in some European cities, some of the 
experiences with regulatory changes are summarized and conclusions and recommendations 
pointed out and discussed. 
DIFFERENT MARKET SEGMENTS MAY CALL FOR 
DIFFERENT REGULATORY APPROACHES 
Three major market segments exist in the taxi industry. These are the taxi rank segment, the 
hailing segment and the telephone-booking segment. The two first can be designated as the 
street work segment. These segments may call for different regulatory approaches.  
 
The taxi rank segment and the hailing segment are unique to the taxi industry. They have 
more in common with a fresh goods market than with other markets. In general, these 
segments are recognized by a great number of suppliers as well as a great number of 
consumers. All of them being small, this would be the ideal situation for an efficient market 
solution. However, problems related to imperfect and asymmetric information are frequently 
observed. The spatial nature of these segments also creates problems. Further, unofficial 
“first-in-first-out” rules may also hamper free competition. As a result, there will be problems 
related to a pure market solution of these segments.    
 
In the telephone-booking segment, customers are in a better position to shop around for the 
desired service and level of quality at an acceptable fare. Because, dispatching centrals clearly 
have great economies of scale, the problem may be to avoid monopolistic behaviour. 
Differences in the relative size of these segments may explain different outcomes of 
regulatory changes. 
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In several countries, taxis play an important role in providing public transport services that are 
usually carried out on a contractual basis often through dispatching centres. The contracts 
cover school and medical transport as well as transport of the disabled and elderly. The table 
below shows some estimates of the percentage of trips paid for by the public sector. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of trips paid for by the public sector. Source: Bekken 2003  
 Less than 10% 10%-25% More than 25% Figures N/A 
Case-study 
cities 
Berlin, Helsinki, 
Vienna 
Brussels, Amsterdam, 
Dublin, Oslo 
Stockholm Geneva, Budapest, 
London, Madrid, Paris 
Countries 
(average) 
Germany  Belgium, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Hungary, 
Sweden, Norway 
Austria, France, Ireland, 
Spain, Switzerland, 
Great Britain  
 
In most of the countries, public sector contracts are even more important in rural areas. The 
national average indicates that in most of the countries, they account for more than 25% of all 
trips. It is therefore of vital interest for the taxi industry to be treated on equal terms with 
other industries in large public tenders. Because of the organisation of the taxi industry, with 
its many small operators, DCs may play an important role in co-ordinating negotiations for 
such contracts. 
 
In some European countries, most notably in Ireland, Germany, Austria and the UK, 
regulation of small public transport vehicles is based on a two-tier system. This allows for 
different regulation between the Private-Hire-Vehicle (PHV) sector and the taxi sector. The 
main difference between the two is primarily that PHVs are not allowed to ply for hire. PHVs 
can only accept pre-arranged services. The status as of 2001 is summarized below for a 
number of European countries. 
 
Table 2: The significance of the PHV sector in different countries 
Country Size of the PHV sector compared to the 
taxi sector (number of licences) 
Comments  
Austria Significant (approximately 59 %) “Mietwagens” - Only allowed to pre-book trips. No 
requirements for drivers.  
Belgium Mainly deluxe hire services  
Finland No sector  
Denmark No sector, was integrated in the taxi sector (legislation) in the 1970s 
France Approx. 7 % “Véhicules de location” 
Not as heavily regulated as ordinary taxis 
Germany Approx 40 % “Mietwagens” - Fares not regulated and taximeter not 
required. Not allowed to ply for hire. 
Ireland Significant, but declined after deregulation. Fares not regulated and taximeter not required. Not 
allowed to ply for hire. 
The 
Netherlands 
No sector  
Norway No sector  
Spain Insignificant primarily luxury vehicles (3-4%)  
Sweden No sector  
Switzerland 30% in Geneva, smaller share outside. The PHVs carry out only a small amount of trips 
UK Important sector Fares not regulated and taximeter not required. Not 
allowed to ply for hire. 
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In countries with a distinct PHV sector, the level of DC affiliation tends to be smaller. The 
obvious reason for this is that PHVs are only allowed to operate from a DC or similar facility. 
The result is that taxis to a larger extent focus on street work rather than competing with the 
PHVs on the booking market. This also tends to hamper the technological development of 
DCs. If it is a desired policy to increase the strength and the importance of the DCs, a large 
PHV industry will tend to discourage this. On the other hand, DC affiliation may not be as 
necessary in markets based on ranks and street hire. The lowest level of DC affiliation found 
by Bekken (2003) was in the three largest cities (Madrid, Paris and London). This may be 
because in these cities less traffic is generated through telephone bookings. It is likely that the 
size and population density of a city influences the size of the spot market.  
 
The presence of a PHV industry also seems to be a way to tailor the regulation to different 
market segments. This is particularly related to fares. The customers are most likely to be 
exploited when catching a cab curbside or from a rank. Thus, some countries maintain strict 
fare regulation on these segments while allowing the PHV sector to compete in the segments 
where customers are in a stronger position to shop around. 
 
REGULATORY APPROACHES IN EUROPE 
Taxis and Private Hire Vehicles (PHVs) provide a very “local” service. The majority of trips 
take place within a city, municipality or a region. When taxis leave the area they are stationed, 
they usually return as soon as possible. This is no surprise considering the alternatives for 
longer trips, such as bus and rail. As a result of this local focus, the taxi industry and its 
regulatory framework have developed in a widely divergent manner throughout Europe and 
the rest of the world. To some extent, the industry has also developed differently within the 
same country. Due to the different starting point and differences between cities and countries 
it is no surprise that the outcomes from regulatory changes differ. Some cities have focussed 
on direct barriers to entry creating a maximum number of cabs and even allowed licences to 
be traded (Paris, New York, In Ireland until 2001, whereas other have relied on more indirect 
barriers to entry into the industry (Sweden). Regarding the regulation of fares, only a few 
cities (Oslo, Sweden) have deregulated. 
  
The taxi industry is not only based on very local markets with little outside competition, all of 
the markets also consist of different market segments. As will be discussed, these segments 
may call for different regulatory approaches.  
 
The taxi industry is highly complex with a great range of regulatory approaches and 
organisational structures. Unfortunately, much of the literature related to the taxi industry 
considers the taxi industry as one homogenous industry and does not address the complexity 
of its sub-markets and the different organisational structures or regional differences. As a 
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result, only a small proportion of the literature makes any attempt to clarify and define the 
services, players and markets discussed and the relevant markets. 
 
In line with Toner (1997), I have identified three major groups of regulation concerning the 
taxi industry. Toner focussed on quantity regulation or the conferment of monopoly rights, the 
imposition of entry conditions and at last the control of fare. Following the outline set out in 
Bekken (2003), I have chosen a somewhat different diversion between the two first issues, 
taking into account the fact that quantity regulation is a barrier to entry and that in most of the 
cities considered, the conferment of monopoly rights is not absolute. Thus, I have classified 
the regulation concerning the taxi industry in the following groups:  
a) direct barriers to entry,  
b) indirect barriers to entry and  
c) fare regulations.  
The direct barriers to entry relates primarily to the quantitative and qualitative regulations on 
the operators. The indirect regulation covers all other aspects creating barriers to entry. Taxi 
driver requirements and vehicle requirements are important in that respect. 
Direct barriers to entry 
The supply of a taxi service is dependent upon taxi operators (or proprietors) putting taxi 
vehicles in service. The direct barriers to entry are related to quantitative restrictions on the 
supply side of the market (number of operators and/or taxis per operator), or qualitative 
requirements imposed on the operators allowed in the market. Both of these create direct 
barriers to entry. The first directly involves a limit on the supply of services, whereas the 
second introduces a “cost of entry” for the taxi operator that may be more or less difficult to 
meet for potential entrants. New operators must satisfy the quality requirements before they 
face the quantity restrictions.  
Quantitative regulations 
Quantitative regulations involve (some degree of) control of the number of taxis on the streets 
(market access) and thus the supply in the taxi market. The degree of regulation is a 
continuum, ranging from totally closed markets with no new entrants allowed, to markets 
without any restrictions on the number of operators or taxis. The regulation is usually 
achieved by some kind of licensing regime. The criteria used for issuing licences are crucial 
in determining how tight market access is actually regulated. It is important not only to focus 
on the actual regulation, but also on the degree of regulation. A very flexible or lax regulation 
of market access may be very close to open entry. Quantitative regulation has been widely 
used in the taxi industry. It effectively reduces the threat of competition to the incumbents. 
This may create a scarcity value, which may be “harvested” if the licences are traded. In other 
cases the licences are not tradable but issued by authorities based on certain criteria such as 
seniority or by a lottery. Some times, the licences are not only a right but also entail a duty to 
serve the local community. 
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The table below provides a brief summary of the quantity regulations on the number of taxi 
operators in some European countries and cities. The table also indicate that some countries 
have delegated the decision on the regulatory approach to local authorities. 
 
Table 3: Summary of quantity regulations in some European countries. Source: Bekken (2003) 
National legislation on access to the market 
Number of operators 
regulated 
Number of operators not 
regulated 
No national legislation 
(Local authority decides) 
Norway, Finland, Germany, 
France, Spain  
Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Austria, Hungary 
GB (not regulated in London), Belgium, 
Switzerland 
 
In some cases, the quantity regulation is close to a predetermined ceiling. In this situation, 
there is a static restriction on the number of taxis. A ceiling, which cannot be altered in the 
short term, determines the number of taxis. This is the extreme. Something close to a fixed 
ceiling system is found in Paris. The situation in Dublin before deregulation in 2000 was also 
one with a fixed ceiling system. Fingleton, Evans and Hogan (1998) reported that between 
1978 and 1998, the number of licences in Dublin increased only once, by 7.6% in 1992. In 
Brussels a predetermined ceiling also exists, although expansion is possible for certain 
categories of vehicles providing services for disabled people and pensioners, as well as 
ecological vehicles. Outside Europe, the most cited example of such a predetermined ceiling 
is the New York medallion system. 
 
Even though there are no fixed ceilings on the number of taxi, it doesn’t mean that the 
licences are issued whenever someone passes the necessary requirements. There are usually 
certain criteria for issuing the licences. In some cases objective criteria for deciding the 
number of licensed taxis are used. This can be a population ratio or other similar measure. 
Objective criteria for issuing licences do not seem to be common in Europe (Bekken 2003). 
Subjective criteria are the most common criteria for issuing new licences. In such cases, an 
authority assesses the need for an increase or decrease in the number of licences. Often these 
criteria are related to terms as public need, excess demand, excess driver profits and other 
societal reasons. The real differences between objective and subjective criteria however may 
be small. 
Quality standards on access to the profession for taxi operators 
Such requirements are qualitative requirements which all operators must fulfil before they are 
allowed to exercise the profession of taxi operator. Thus, these requirements apply directly to 
new entrants (operators) into the industry. Such requirements usually exist in addition to the 
regulation on market access. The difference is that the regulation on market access may be 
definite, whereas everyone may try to pass the quality standards. Nevertheless, these two 
regulations must be considered together as they form the direct barriers to entry. Following 
political decisions in the EU to liberalise the economy, the EU has adopted some Directives 
with the aim to replace quantitative control with qualitative control (Council Directive 96/26 
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98/76/EC). The directive sets out requirements regarding the professional competence, 
financial requirements and requirements regarding the repute of operators. The Directives do 
not yet apply to the taxi industry, but some countries have nevertheless incorporated them for 
the taxi industry. The most widely used quality standards used are: 
 Criminal record check. Both white-collar criminality is known to exist in the taxi 
industry. An important preventive step is to set requirements regarding criminal 
records for operators. 
 Requirements regarding professional competence. These are important to ensure the 
professionalism of taxi operators. Most countries in their requirements regarding 
professional competence include topics such as knowledge of relevant laws, 
knowledge of how to run a company, and knowledge of accounting and economics. 
Among the countries investigated by Bekken (2003), most also required a written 
exam to access the profession.  
 Financial/solvency requirements. In several countries, economic or financial/solvency 
requirements are imposed on operators. These may be very different, ranging from 
direct assets to bank guarantees and financial guarantees. Licence fees and 
requirements regarding annual earnings are also among the financial/solvency 
requirements to be found. Some countries additionally have an “assessment” of the 
economic stability of prospective operators. This is mostly related to previous 
experience of running a business and a check on any previous public debts. Solvency 
requirements vary greatly. Sweden has by far the strictest financial regime of the 
countries in the study by Bekken (2003), even exceeding the requirement in EU 
Directive 96/26. Other countries that reported substantial financial requirements were 
Austria (€7,500), Germany (€2,250) and Norway (€9,000). The payment of VAT and 
national insurance contributions is also important in the assessment of economic 
stability in other countries. 
Overall tightness of the direct barriers to entry 
Quality standards for access to the profession and regulation of market access together form 
the direct barriers to entry. These must be considered together. In Bekken (2003), 13 
European cities were grouped into four groups based on the strictness of the regulations on 
market access and quality standards respectively. This is summarized below. 
   
Table 4: The tightness of direct barriers to entry. Source: Bekken (2003) 
Quality standards on operators  
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Indirect barriers to entry 
The indirect barriers to entry are related to aspects other than the operators in the market. All 
requirements imposed on an industry inflicts on the cost of entry and thus indirectly and to 
different degree to the barriers to entry. 
 
Taxi driver requirements are the most common indirect barrier to entry. Usually, some 
qualifications for driving a taxi are required. When qualified to access the taxi driving 
profession, the person is granted a taxi driver’s licence or equivalent. In many cases 
professional requirements (area knowledge etc) and medical requirements are imposed and 
suitability considered (criminal record or other) before a taxi driver’s licence is granted. Very 
strict requirements may prevent operators from expanding their business, thus indirectly 
regulating the supply. The “Knowledge” in London, which is the common name of the area 
knowledge test to be passed by prospective London taxi drivers, is an example of this. In 
some cases, the taxi driver requirements also function as quality requirements for operators. 
This is the case if operators are required by law to fulfil the requirements for taxi drivers.  
 
Table 5: Taxi driver requirements in Europe. Source: Bekken (2003) 
Professional competence (exam/test)  Criminal 
record 
check 
Type of 
exam 
Local area 
knowledge test 
Other 
Medical 
certificate 
Validity of taxi 
driver’s 
licence 
Austria X Written Yes (Included in exam)  X Unlimited 
Brussels 
 X Mixed 
Yes 
(Included in exam) 
Driving test optional 
(local choice) X 
Must be renewed 
yearly 
Finland X Written  Yes Course required X Until revoked 
France X Written  Course required X 1 year 
Germany X Written Yes (Included in exam) - X 5 years revocable 
Hungary X  
Written 
 
Yes 
(Included in exam) 
3-week course 
required X Until revoked 
Ireland X Written (Dublin) No   5 years 
The 
Netherlands X None   X  
Norway X (Optional – written) 
Optional  
(local choice)  X  
Spain X Written Yes (Included in exam)    
Sweden X Written Optional  (local choice)  X Until revoked 
Geneva X Written Yes  X Unlimited 
London X Interview X  X 
3 years, 
renewable, 
revocable 
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Other quality and service requirements concern the quality of the services offered and the 
service itself. Most of these are requirements related to the vehicles, the drivers and the 
operators. These types of requirements are very common in most industries providing 
personal services, including the taxi industry. The main purpose of quality and service 
requirements is to assure a minimum level of quality of service. Regulations may also assure 
different groups of customers a predetermined level of service. Quality and service 
regulations have often been used to alleviate the negative effects of cut-throat competition and 
asymmetric information between customers and service providers. 
Fare regulation  
Fare regulation is often a controversial topic. Different countries have chosen different 
approaches to this issue. The differences between fixed and free fare setting policies are 
important. However other intermediate practices, such as maximum and minimum fares must 
also be considered. Information is a key aspect. For competition to work properly consumers 
must be able to assess the fare in advance and use it as a basis for selection of service 
provider. In some segments of the taxi industry this is rarely the case. It is also important to 
gain a deeper understanding of the different market segments in order to assess the effects of 
fare regulation. In some segments, effective competition based on fares is hard to accomplish. 
In other segments, fares will be the main source of competition. 
 
When considering fare regulation it is important to make a distinction between the fare 
structure and individual fares. The fare structure may be regulated whereas the fare level can 
be set freely. The table below is based on Bekken (2003) and summarizes the status of fare 
regulation in the 13 countries in 2002. For some of the countries, Belgium, Switzerland and 
Great Britain, local authorities have great discretion. As a result, the focus is on some major 
cities instead. 
 
Table 6: Summary of fare regulation in Europe. Source: Bekken (2003) 
Fare regulation  No fare 
regulation  Fixed Max 
Requirements for 
fare structure Other features 
Austria  X  Detailed Not regulated for PHVs 
Belgium   X  In Brussels, the fares function as fixed fares 
Finland   X Info required Function as fixed fares 
France   X Detailed Local authority decides fare and structure. The national authority decides increase. 
Germany  X  Detailed Not regulated for PHVs 
Hungary 
(In Budapest)   X  
Function as free fares. Local authorities may 
regulate fares 
Ireland 
(In Dublin)  X X  
Not regulated for PHVs. Local authorities 
may decide on fixed or maximum fares. 
The 
Netherlands   X  
Not regulated when booked through a DC 
Norway In some 
major cities  X  
Fares deregulated in cities with more than 
one Dispatching Central 
Sweden X    Strict rules on fare information 
Switzerland 
(In Geneva)   X  
Local authority decides fare and structure. 
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GB 
(In London)  X    
Outside London, local authorities free to 
decide. Not regulated for PHVs 
 
EXPERIENCES WITH REGULATORY CHANGES 
Having considered the regulatory regimes in some European countries, I will now turn to 
experiences with deregulation.  This chapter summarize the experiences as reported in a 
number of different sources. Focus is on the effects of regulatory changes in European 
countries. Since much of the literature concerning regulation of the taxi industry relies on US 
experiences a brief introduction to the US experiences is also included. Furthermore, the 
deregulation in New Zealand is included as it is very interesting and may shed a light on the 
most recent regulatory changes in Europe. The summary of experiences from regulatory 
changes is primarily based on Bekken and Longva (2003). UK experiences with regulatory 
changes have been documented in a number of different sources, such as Toner (1996 and 
1997) and more recently by the Office of Fair Trading in their study of the regulation of 
licensed taxi and PHV services in the UK (OFT 2003). Unfortunately, I have reviewed these 
findings sufficiently, although they provide very good insights. 
 
US Deregulation and re-regulation 
In most US cities the taxi industry was brought under municipal or state regulation during the 
late 1920s or 1930s (Teal and Berglund 1987). The reason was the extremely competitive 
conditions following the Great Depression, which were a result of the low cost of entering the 
taxi industry at times when other jobs were hard to find. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
several US cities deregulated. The results of the changes in the US taxi regulation have been 
discussed in several papers. The most thorough assessment of the US experiences is presented 
by Teal & Berglund (1987).  They evaluate the impact of deregulation in six cities, all having 
deregulated both entry and fares and with reasonably good data on the impacts. Price 
Waterhouse (1993) also summarizes effects from several US cities. More recently, the ITRE 
(1998) and Dempsey (2001) have also summarized and discussed experiences from 
deregulation in the US. 
  
The main reported short-term effect of deregulation in the US was a dramatic increase in 
supply. Notably, though, the increased supply mainly occurred at already well-served 
locations such as airports and major cabstands. This was a result of the fact that most new 
entrants were independent operators and thus small fleet operators who were unable to serve 
the telephone market. At these locations, waiting times for customers were already short. This 
finding is reported both by Teal & Berglund (1987) and Price Waterhouse (1993). The 
consequences of deregulation in the three US cities studied by the ITRE (1998) were similar 
to those reported by earlier literature. 
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In the deregulated US cities, an increase in trip refusals occurred. As a result, consumers only 
experienced a marginal service improvement, according to the report by Teal and Berglund 
(1987). They rejected the argument by Frankena and Pautler (1984) that service 
improvements inevitably would follow new entry. Price Waterhouse also reported a decline in 
service quality. Trip refusal, increased vehicle age and soliciting for passengers were the 
primary results. According to Price Waterhouse, this was caused by over-supply. It is also 
interesting to note that the short-term effects were less adverse in smaller cities with an 
insignificant cabstand market. In all of the US case study cities, prices rose. The report by 
Price Waterhouse argued that this was a result of lagged cost increases and the fact that the 
cabstand market was generally price insensitive and lacked competition due to the first-in 
first-out nature of taxi queues. 
  
Teal and Berglund (1987) reported from their study that taxi rates were higher in real terms in 
all of the cities investigated. The increase occurred immediately after deregulation. This was 
partly because rate increase was overdue in the regulated regime. Further, the report found the 
upward trends of rates to be even more pronounced in cabstand markets than in telephone 
order markets. The two major explanations they offered were both related to demand. First, 
demand was characterized by imperfect information and strong name recognition (branding). 
Second demand might be inelastic; consequently customers do not pay much attention to the 
fares. 
Sweden – full deregulation and enhanced quality standards 
The Swedish population of 8.8 million occupies a country of 450,000 square kilometres. This 
suggests a very sparsely populated country. However, most of the population is concentrated 
in the southern parts of the country. The Swedish taxi industry is organized into a large 
number of small operators. On average, each operator has 1.7 taxi vehicles across the country 
as a whole. This is also reflected in the use of salaried drivers. Most taxi drivers in Sweden 
are owner-drivers (70%). Only 30 per cent are salaried employees. In Stockholm and the other 
large cities, even fewer drivers are salaried employees. The Swedish taxi industry is heavily 
computerised. Most DCs have computerised contact with the affiliated drivers. There are few 
“independent” operators (“friåkare”), most operators are affiliated to a DC.  
 
Taxis are also extensively used for public purposes. In the country as a whole, public sector 
contracts amount to about 56 per cent of the total taxi trips (SOU 1999). The public sector is 
required by law to use public tendering for all contracts above a certain threshold. DCs or 
other driver cooperatives may join forces and compete for such contracts. No Private Hire 
Vehicle industry (PHV) exists. All passenger transport from door-to door is regarded as a taxi 
service and must follow the requirements for such transport. Exceptions are made for some 
public services. 
 
It is also important to have in mind that the telephone-booking segment is dominant in 
Sweden as shown by the table below. Some of the experiences must be viewed in light of this. 
In particular this has supported fare competition.   
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Table 7: Estimated proportion of taxi trips by type of market segment in Sweden and share of 
subsidized trips. Source: Gärling (1993) and SOU (1999). 
 Stockholm Large 
cities 
Medium 
cities 
Rural areas Sweden 
Telephone booking 
segment 
70% 68% 79% 82% N/A 
Other (street work) 30% 32% 21% 18% N/A 
Subsidized taxi transport 15-20%   More than 
90% 
56% 
 
 
Internationally, Sweden is one of the most important cases when discussing experiences from 
deregulation as the experiences is well documented. The Swedish taxi market was deregulated 
on July 1st 1990. The reason for the deregulation was that the taxi industry was believed to be 
inefficient due to a mismatch of supply and demand and a lack of price competition. It was 
believed that this resulted in excess waiting time for passengers and too high fares. After the 
deregulation in 1990, anyone could register as a taxi operator and charge the fare he wanted. 
Only a few requirements applied to the operators. The licence areas were all merged and taxis 
were allowed to operate freely all over Sweden. The required DC affiliation was also 
abandoned. At the same time, VAT was introduced on taxis. 
  
Changes came about instantly after the deregulation. Major changes were: more vehicles, new 
profiles on cabs affiliated to different DCs and changes in tariff structure. Taxi fares rose, 
contrary to expectations (partly due to the included service and the lag in prices compared to 
taxi costs and the inclusion of VAT). More recently, however, fares have increased in line 
with inflation. Since deregulation, several new regulations have been introduced. In 1995, 
stricter rules for the taxi driver’s licence were introduced. A practical driver’s test was also 
introduced. Today, Sweden has some of the strictest rules for acquiring a taxi driver’s licence. 
There are also strict requirements for operators. To make fare competition function better, 
strict rules on information have been introduced. Taxi companies are required have the same 
fare schedule for all vehicles and to state a standard fare clearly on each vehicle. Thus, 
competition is mainly between companies, not drivers. 
 
When considering the short-term effects, it is important to have in mind that the deregulation 
took place prior to an economic recession and at the same time as VAT was introduced on 
taxis. Several taxi companies went bankrupt and taxi drivers lost their jobs. The increased 
number of vehicles reduced the efficiency of each vehicle and salaries for drivers decreased 
by up to 25% in larger towns. After deregulation, the role of DCs has increased. The reduced 
utilisation has not offset the increased supply and as a result, availability has increased. 
Unfortunately, crime in the industry both financially and assaults on passengers have 
increased. The industry tries to deal with this by approving DCs and recommending 
passengers to use taxis affiliated to such DCs. 
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Table 8: Summary of the Swedish regulatory changes. Source: Bekken and Longva (2003). 
 Before deregulation After deregulation Later adjustments 
Fares Tightly regulated Adjusted for costs 
Free to set. 
Tight requirements on fare 
information 
DCs must have uniform 
maximum fare schedules 
Stricter requirements on 
fare information 
Entry 
Tightly regulated 
Local authorities decided the 
number based on necessity 
Geographical restricted 
Free entry 
No geographical restriction, 
free to operate all over 
Sweden 
Some cooperation 
between operators allowed 
 
Operators 
No major quality requirements 
DC affiliation required 
Schedule for operation to be 
followed 
Some requirements on 
operators’ reputation 
immediate after deregulation 
Further enhancements. EU 
Directive adopted for taxi 
operators as well as other 
transport operators 
Maximum market share of 
DCs introduced 
Drivers Few regulations 
Some requirements on taxi 
drivers’ knowledge and 
reputation introduced 
Further enhancements 
 
Recently, Marrel and Westin (2002) have analysed the effects of the Swedish deregulation, 
with primary focus on rural areas. They conclude that no permanent increase in the number of 
vehicles occurred. Prices increased, although some variations occurred depending on the type 
of trip in question. Furthermore, they concluded that efficiency decreased in rural areas 
between 1991 and 1997. In relation to innovation, they found some developments in new 
services and businesses after the deregulation, although it is unclear whether competition has 
been the driving force behind this development. Furthermore, no large-scale enterprises 
emerged in either the urban or the rural areas studied. 
 
Since the deregulation in 1990, several new regulations have been introduced. In 1995, 
stricter rules for the taxi driver’s licence were introduced. Also a practical driver test was 
introduced. Today Sweden has some of the strictest rules for gaining a taxi driver’s licence. 
To make fare competition function better, strict rules on information have been introduced. 
The fare competition requires the different companies or Dispatching Centrals to have a 
standard uniform fare for all their vehicles. The competition is thus mainly between the 
companies, not the drivers. Recently, further steps have been taken to reduce the commercial 
crime within the industry (such as tax and VAT evasion) and to reduce the problem of 
unlicensed taxi drivers (SOU 2004). 
 
Tailored deregulation in New Zealand 
Together with Sweden, New Zealand represents a country where the taxi industry was totally 
deregulated over the whole country at once. The restructuring of the New Zealand taxi 
industry in 1989 was intimately related to decisions to deregulate most aspects of what was 
then a highly controlled economy. Within ten years, New Zealand moved from being one of 
the most regulated of the OECD-countries to being one of the least regulated ones (Morrison 
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1997).  The deregulation was particularly tailored as to assure some concentration of the 
industry. All taxi operators are required to be affiliated to an association providing services 24 
hours/7 days and telephone booking opportunities. Furthermore, new associations must have 
at least 5 vehicles.  
 
Before deregulation in 1989, 4 geographically based Transport Licensing Authorities (TLA) 
controlled the number of taxi operator’s licences. Additional licences were seldom issued, 
creating rising prices for the existing tradable licences as demand generally exceeded supply. 
The removal of the restrictions effectively wiped out the scarcity value of licences (Morrison 
1997). Fares were equally tightly regulated as the Secretary for Transport fixed a fare 
schedule for the different licence areas. No fare regulations currently apply in New Zealand. 
Individual taxi organisations can set their own fare schedule. The only requirements are that 
maximum fares are registered with the Secretary of Transport, calibrated on the taximeter and 
displayed both inside and outside the taxi. Thus, individual operators are not allowed to set 
their own fare schedule but must follow the schedule of the association. The lifting of 
quantitative restrictions allowed a whole variety of new drivers to enter the industry, which 
led to the imposition of additional qualitative requirements such as the display of 
identification cards, procedures for passenger safety, and the (re)introduction of area-
knowledge requirements. So while New Zealand removed restrictions on the licence numbers 
and taxi fares charges in 1989, most qualitative controls remained – and in certain respects 
were strengthened. 
 
After deregulation, the number of companies in the metropolitan areas increased three times 
and a massive increase in the number of taxis also occurred. In 1989 there were 2,762 
vehicles nationwide, while by 1994 these had increased to 7,181, a figure far outweighing the 
growth in population figures. However, the availability of taxi services in smaller areas 
decreased marginally under regulation (Morrison 1997). Post-deregulation has also been 
characterised by a series of mergers between the largest taxi organisations, while at the same 
time creating leeway for entrants of many smaller operators. Fares have declined in real terms 
in the larger cities (i.e. 15% to 25%), while the changes in the smaller towns were more 
ambiguous (Morrison 1997). More interesting, however, is the introduction of differential 
pricing components.  Overall, both Gaunt (1996) and Morrison (1997) note that, especially in 
the larger cities, the consumer has benefited from deregulation by greater numbers of taxis, 
shorter waiting times, and a greater range of services. In the smaller towns, however, the 
results seem more ambiguous. In addition, quantitative deregulation has been accompanied by 
increased regulatory cost due to significant increases in quality control. 
 
Due to the service requirements of the association and the required affiliation to an 
association, the costs of monitoring the industry have been reduced. This has also assured that 
economies of scale have been achieved as well as service innovations. 
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Ireland – abrupt changes and extraordinary increase in the number of taxis 
Compared to most European countries, Ireland has a very high number of taxis per capita 
(Bekken and Longva 2003). Furthermore, the PHV industry also provides a substantial 
number of trips, which come in addition to the services provided by taxis. Most taxis are 
affiliated to a DC. The majority of the taxi operators in Ireland are independent owner-drivers. 
There are very few salaried drivers. On average, there are almost as many taxis as there are 
operators. The Dublin taxi market is very much based on the street segments. 
 
Until 2000, the Irish taxi industry had been very tightly regulated for years, with regard to 
both fares and entry. New licences were rarely issued. Several reports showed a great 
mismatch between supply and demand of taxi services prior to the changes in 2000. In 
January 2000, the Ministry of the Environment and Local Government decided to increase the 
number of taxi licences by 3,200. These were to be issued to current licensees. This decision 
was taken to court, based on preferential treatment of current licensees over and above 
newcomers. The High Court decided against the Ministry stating that the restriction of access 
to licences to current licensees exceeded the powers of the Minister. This decision effectively 
cleared the way for deregulation of entry restrictions to the Irish taxi industry.  
 
The only regulation, which actually was altered in 2000, was access to the market. The other 
regulations of the taxi industry were more or less as before. Fares were tightly regulated 
whereas the requirements of drivers and operators were lightly regulated. No other changes 
were introduced as to alleviate the possible negative effects of deregulation. The early result 
of the deregulation is summarized in Goodbody (2001a) and Goodbody (2001b). The 
deregulation effectively wiped out the second hand value of the tradable licence plates. 
Certain licence holders suffered extreme personal financial hardship and as a result a 
Hardship Panel was established as to consider the need for compensation. 
 
Based on the effects of the deregulation, the Competition Authority (2002) suggested some 
improvements to the legislation. Firstly, fares should be rebalanced to reduce excess supply 
and assure adequate service at all times. The maximum fares should continue to be set by 
local government. Secondly, quality standards should be tightened. On 26 July 2003, the Irish 
Government passed the Taxi Regulation Bill 2003, which introduced some re-regulation of 
the taxi industry. Following the deregulation, the authorities have also established the Office 
of Taxi Regulator. One of its duties will be to assess the applications for financial 
compensation and to prepare some new legislation to improve the reputation of the industry. 
The proposals of the Taxi Regulator will be made public in July. The proposal is based on a 
thorough investigation and consultations with different stakeholders. Bekken and Steen 
(2005) prepared an international review of taxi legislation for the Taxi Regulator.  
 
The Irish experiences show that when entry is liberalised without other direct barriers to entry 
being introduced, the number of taxi operators will increase significantly. Salaried drivers 
prefer to become owners rather than working as salaried drivers. As a result, the utilisation of 
each taxi decreases. More taxis will be operated on a one-shift turn. The demand for taxi 
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services did not increase as much as the supply. This has reduced the profitability in the 
industry and put a pressure on quality and fares. When fares are capped, reduced quality may 
be a way to increase profitability. Consumers have benefited from the increased availability 
through reduced waiting time. This however is most important for the street work segments. 
Furthermore, new entrants primarily focus on the taxi rank segment, rather than the telephone 
booking segment. 
Stepwise deregulation in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands is one of the world’s most densely populated areas. More than 90 per cent of 
the population live in cities (Johansson et al 2000). However, the population is more 
concentrated in the southern part of the country, rather than the north. The Dutch taxi industry 
is comprised of a large number of small units, but also a number of larger companies. There is 
a high level of DC affiliation in the Netherlands. In the 4 largest cities 89 per cent of the taxis 
are affiliated to a DC, whereas in the Netherlands as a whole, 67 per cent are affiliated (Nipo 
2002). The competition between the DCs is also good.  The importance of the different 
market segments differs greatly between urban and rural areas in the Netherlands. In the 4 
largest cities, the streetwork has a market share of 55%, whereas the average for the entire 
country is 21%. Taxis are also extensively used for public purposes. In the country as a 
whole, close to 60 per cent of the trips are carried out via public sector contracts. This ranges 
from a low 21 per cent in the four largest cities to a high 76 per cent in rural areas.  
 
A new Passenger Transport Act came into effect on 1 January 2000. The objectives of the 
new Act were to strengthen the role of the taxi with respect to other modes of transport and 
motivate more people to use taxis more often. The Act included both re-regulation and 
deregulation of certain aspects and supportive measures as well as intensified supervision and 
enforcement: It was to be gradually implemented from 2000 to 2004. This stepwise 
implementation was made as ensure a swift transition to the new regime and to allow for 
monitoring of the effects in order to modify components of the law if necessary. The most 
important changes as reported in EIM (2002), NIPO (2002) and Bekken and Longva (2003) 
were: 
 Regulation on access to the market has gradually been revoked, starting 1 January 
2000 and finished by 1 January 2002. During this period a minimum turnover and a 
30-hour working week were required. Before the new Transport Act, access was 
regulated but demand was taken into account and new licences could be issued (no 
predetermined ceiling).  
 Fixed fares were changed to maximum fares. However, for the contract market, fares 
are free. The change to maximum fares was the first step towards full deregulation of 
fares.  
 The entire country became a single working area, as opposed to several 
licence/working areas previously. This change became effective from 1.1.2002.  
 Centralised enforcement (as opposed to local before). The reason for this was to 
ensure equal requirements for drivers, operators and vehicles throughout the country.  
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After deregulation, a significant increase in the number of taxis and the availability were 
experienced in all areas, regardless of market characteristics. However, in cities where the taxi 
rank segment dominates, the newcomers have been small owner-drivers, whereas in areas 
where the telephone-booking segment dominates, the incumbents have expanded their 
business. Taxi usage has not increased, as was the intention behind the deregulation. Thus, 
demand seems to be linked to other factors than the mere supply of taxis.  The availability has 
increased most at taxi ranks and at night and in weekends, which has clearly benefited the 
consumers. Some of this increased supply is related to the removal of designated licence areas 
for the taxis. This has made it possible for operators from rural areas to supply services in 
major cities in the weekends when demand is low in rural areas. 
 
Table 9:  Summary of the effects of the Dutch regulatory changes. Where nothing is stated, the same 
applies to medium sized municipalities and rural areas as for large municipalities. Source Bekken and 
Longva (2003) 
 Large municipalities 
(Cities) 
Medium sized 
municipalities 
Rural areas 
Market 
characteristics 
The taxi rank segment 
dominates. Some 
contract work 
The telephone booking 
and taxi rank segments 
are quite similar. More 
than half of the trips on 
contracts 
The taxi rank and hailing 
segments are 
insignificant, most traffic 
from telephone booking. 
Most trips on contract 
Supply and taxi 
usage 
Significant increase in the 
number of taxis. Primarily 
focussed on the taxi rank 
segment. 
Taxi usage has increased 
but not very much 
The effect on supply is 
similar to that of large 
cities but more 
pronounced. 
Taxi usage declined 
A significant increase in 
the number of taxis, 
however, the average 
size of operators also 
increased. 
Taxi usage has declined 
after an increase the first 
year after deregulation 
Fares The fares increased the 
first year and fell the 
second year in real 
terms. Since deregulation 
fares have increased by 
close to 5% in real terms. 
A maximum tariff exists, 
but most taxis charge 
below this 
 The fares increased the 
first year and fell the 
second year in real 
terms. The overall fare 
increase equal to that of 
large cities. A maximum 
tariff exists, but most 
taxis charge below this 
Level of 
services  
Increased availability, 
primarily at taxi ranks and 
in weekends. 
Customers still follow 
habit and choose the first 
taxi in line rather than the 
best deal 
  
Organisation The average size of 
operators has declined, 
as more independent 
owner-drivers have 
entered the market 
 The average size of 
operators has increased 
indicating expanded 
business of current 
operators rather than 
new entrants 
Innovation No significant new 
services have occurred 
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The stepwise deregulation has made alleviating policies possible. This has allowed the 
authorities to react to undesired effects. Currently some of the changes, in particular the 
liberalisation of fares have been put on a hold.  
 
Norway – fare deregulation with quantity control 
In contrary to the Netherlands, Norway is a very sparsely populated country. The number of 
taxis per capita is quite high compared to other European countries (Bekken 2003). Salaried 
drivers are used extensively and almost all taxi operators are affiliated to a DC (in fact, DC 
affiliation is compulsory). The high grade of DC affiliation has resulted in a high level of 
technology and a high degree of vehicle and driver utilisation. The figures in the table below 
are from 1997, however, the significance of the telephone-booking segment has not changed 
considerably. A survey among taxi customers nationwide (Norges Taxiforbund 1997) showed 
that almost 20 per cent of the taxi trips were paid for by the public sector. This ranged from 
almost 50 per cent in the most rural areas to 10 per cent in the largest urban areas 
 
Table 10: Proportion of Taxi Trips by type of market segment in Norway. Source: Norges Taxiforbund 
(1997) and Bekken and Longva (2003). 
 Oslo Large cities Medium cities Small areas Norway 
Telephone booking 
segment 64% 60% 74% 90% 68% 
Taxi rank segment 32% 37% 24% 6% 29% 
Hailing segment 4% 3% 2% 4% 3% 
 
In Norway the taxi licence is personal and limits the operator to one vehicle. As a result, a 
large number of small units exist. Salaried drivers are used extensively. The vehicles have a 
high grade of utilisation, which also require extensive use of hired drivers. The requirement to 
provide a service at all hours makes salaried drivers necessary. In some areas several DCs are 
competing. However, in most licence areas only one DC exists. On average 20 per cent of the 
taxi services are related to public sector contracts. Almost all taxi operators are affiliated to a 
DC (in fact, DC affiliation is required). The high grade of DC affiliation has resulted in a high 
level of technology and a high degree of vehicle and driver utilisation. 
 
Another approach to the regulation of the taxi industry has been adopted in Norway compared 
to most other countries reforming their regulation. The regulation of fares has been revoked in 
some urban areas, whereas the number of taxis still is regulated. The fares have only been 
liberalised in areas where there are competing DCs. 
 
The Competition Authority has investigated the effect on fares after deregulation 
(Konkurransetilsynet 2001). They found that fares in general increased. The fare increase on 
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weekdays has been relatively small, whereas the increase has been most notable at weekends 
and at night. The Norwegian Consumer Council investigated fare levels and fare structures in 
the deregulated areas two years after deregulation (Forbrukerrådet 2002). This comparison 
also illustrates that there are great differences within the different deregulated areas. If the 
customer was fully informed, he could save between 14 and 34 per cent on the same trip in 
Oslo by choosing the cheaper taxi. The figures were depending on the time of the day. To 
conclude, the effect of the fare liberalisation has not been any fierce competition. Prices seem 
to have increased rather than decreased. Problems with price information have also arisen.  
 
Table 11: Summary of the effects of the Norwegian regulatory changes. Where nothing is stated, the 
same applies to medium sized municipalities and rural areas as for large municipalities. Source 
Bekken and Longva (2003) 
 Large municipalities (cities) Medium sized municipalities Rural areas 
(No changes have occurred 
in these areas) 
Supply Number of licences 
increased by the authorities 
Number of licences 
increased by the authorities 
 
Fares Significant initial increase. 
The second year, the 
increase followed the CPI. 
Greater fare differentiation, 
major increase at times 
when demand exceeds 
supply 
Significant initial increase, 
however smaller than in the 
largest cities. 
Greater fare differentiation, 
major increase at times 
when demand exceeds 
supply 
 
Level of 
services  
The supply at night and in 
weekends has increased 
due to the increased fare 
and thus increased revenue 
potential. 
Taxi usage, however, has 
dropped. 
  
Organisation No change   
Innovation New fixed fare services to 
and from certain locations. 
This has made fare 
comparison easier 
  
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The impacts of regulatory changes vary between different cities. Different market 
characteristics and different strengths of the different segments are important when assessing 
the impacts. However, based on the experiences from the above countries some lessons may 
be learned and some future need for research identified.  
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Supply 
Supply increases when entry restrictions are removed. Thus, the waiting time for consumers is 
reduced and availability increases. New entrants into the industry primarily focus on the 
hailing and the taxi rank segments. In areas where the telephone booking market dominates, 
the increased supply occurs through the expansion of existing operators. In rural areas, the 
overall increase in availability is less than in urban areas. 
 
From an economic point of view more supply is not necessarily better. The major focus 
should be on a proper balance between fares, availability and quality. There are costs of 
having idle taxis to be born by the customers at the end. Nevertheless, customers seem to 
value availability very high.  
Fares 
Fares do not necessarily decrease due to fare liberalisation. Rather, they seem to increase and 
become more differentiated. This may be partly due to fares being previously over suppressed 
under a regulated regime. Fares seem to increase most where there is less competition, such as 
at taxi ranks and in rural areas. Some of this may be explained by competition, but some is 
also due to lower taxi utilisation rates in rural areas. The major benefit from fare deregulation 
is related to greater fare differentiation between times of excess demand and excess supply, 
and some new fixed-fare services.  Fares are higher at times when demand exceeds supply 
and consumers benefit through the increased supply that is generated.  
 
Experiences from New Zealand and to some extent Norway and Sweden also show that 
measures to improve the bargaining position of consumers can improve fare competition. In 
New Zealand and Norway, DC affiliation is required. This has reduced the number of 
different fare schedules to choose between. In Sweden, strict requirements on fare information 
have been introduced. Based on the above experiences, there are strong indications that a two-
tier system, with maximum fares for the street segments and no fare regulations for the 
telephone-booking segments, will be the most efficient. This is in line with Toner (1997). 
Quality of service 
The falling service quality and vehicle standards reported in several studies do not seem to be 
ultimately linked to free entry. Neither the free market nor heavy entry regulation in itself 
seems to avoid deteriorating service quality over time, both with regards to driver competence 
and vehicle safety standards. Problems related to falling service and vehicle standards must 
indeed be addressed no matter regulatory framework at hand, and several studies indicates 
that it can be overcome by tougher enforcement policies and procedures, increasing driver 
requirements and programs for further competence building. This may, on the other hand, 
lead to higher costs related to quality controls, leaving the net costs results of quantitative 
deregulation uncertain. 
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Quality requirements appear to become increasingly important as entry and/or fares are 
deregulated. In some of the cities and countries investigated, deregulation of entry has 
occurred without quality enhancements. However, in most of these cases, re-regulation or 
quality enhancements have later been introduced. The most recent regulatory changes focus 
more on the quality of service rather than the number of vehicles. It is important to note that 
even modest quality requirements reduce the effects of deregulating entry by creating some 
barriers to entry. 
 
Table 12: Summary of regulatory changes in a selection of countries. Source: Bekken and Longva 
(2003) 
 Market 
characteristics 
Numbers of vehicles Fares Level of service 
Ireland 
(Entry 
deregulated) 
The taxi rank- and 
hailing segments 
dominate (Dublin). 
Massive increase. 
(+200% in Dublin, + 
100% on average). 
Still regulated. Reduced waiting time for 
customers nationwide. 
Primarily at taxi ranks. Small 
improvements in telephone 
booking segment.  
New 
Zealand 
(Fares and 
entry 
deregulated) 
The telephone-booking 
segment important in 
particular outside 
urban areas. 
Massive increase 
(+160% 1989-2001 on 
average). Marginal 
decrease in taxis 
numbers as well as 
availability in rural areas. 
Decline in real terms 
increase in nominal terms. 
Fares increased in real terms 
in rural areas. 
Reduced waiting time. Far 
greater range of services. 
Sweden 
(Fares and 
entry 
deregulated) 
The telephone-booking 
segment dominates. 
Large share (56%) of 
trips subsidized 
(primarily in rural 
areas).  
Increase immediately 
after deregulation, stable 
thereafter. No long term 
increase in rural areas. 
The efficiency has 
decreased. 
Immediate increase (real 
terms), stable thereafter. The 
major increase occurred in 
medium cities and rural 
areas. The cost of 
subsidized trips increased in 
rural areas and decreased in 
cities. 
Reduced waiting time, no 
change in consumer 
satisfaction. 
Norway 
(Fares 
deregulated 
in some 
areas) 
The telephone-booking 
segment dominates 
nationwide. 
Large share (20%) of 
trips subsidized 
(primarily in rural 
areas). 
No change due to 
deregulation. 
Immediate increase (real 
terms), stable thereafter. 
Greater fare differentiations 
(most prominent in large 
cities).  
The supply at night and in 
weekends has increased due 
to the increased revenue 
potential caused by fare 
differentiation.  
The 
Netherlands 
(Entry 
deregulated, 
maximum 
fares)  
The taxi rank segment 
dominates in the 
largest cities, 
telephone segment 
elsewhere. Large 
share of public 
subsidized trips, 
primarily in rural areas. 
Significant increase in 
the number of taxis, 
primarily at taxi ranks.  
Increased the first year and 
fell the second year (real 
terms). 
Increased availability most 
pronounced at taxi ranks in the 
weekends. Taxi usage has 
only increased marginally in 
urban areas and decreased in 
rural areas. 
USA Very different, however 
street work dominates 
in urban areas. 
Massive increase (+18 to 
+127%) 
Increasing Unchanged 
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Efficiency and effectiveness of administration and institutional structures 
A major problem in several countries has been the economic criminality within the taxi 
industry. There are some important aspects to consider in that respect: 
 Enforcement 
 Working time regulations 
 Taxes and VAT 
 Complaint handling 
 
A general problem with the taxi industry has been to provide sufficient enforcement. In some 
countries, such as in Sweden, New Zealand and the Netherlands, this problem has been 
approached by focusing on the self justice among the taxi operators or the Dispatching 
Centrals. When the DCs become the important recognisable supplier of taxi services, it will 
be in their own interest to keep the bad apples out. If not the reputation of all the affiliated 
taxis will deteriorate. This is analogous to the problem of the commons in industries with no 
strong DCs. All taxis will be better off if everybody behaved. However no incentives exist for 
single drivers to do so. Thus a regulation that brings as many taxi operators as possible into 
larger entities will improve the effectiveness for authorities to oversee the business.  
 
There is also reason to believe that the self-justice within the industry is promoted by 
increased professionalisation in the industry. When both drivers and operators receive 
training, they will be more likely to put a pressure on the ones not following the rules. Thus, 
quality requirements focussing on operators training may have a positive impact on the law-
abidingness of the industry. 
 
As previously noted, the taximeters may provide valuable information for consumers. 
Another important aspect is that they may provide valuable information to operators and 
different public authorities and facilitate enforcement of rules and regulations and “clean” 
business practices. The recent Swedish regulatory approach has focussed on this. They have 
proposed stricter requirements on how the information from the taximeters should be 
collected and made available to different authorities. The objective has been to reduce the 
problem of tax and VAT evasion. If such problems exist to a great extent, requirements on 
taximeters may be of great importance. 
Overall comments 
The conclusion from the above discussion may seem to be twofold. First, quality 
requirements, both on operators and drivers should be enhanced, whereas quantity regulations 
should be abolished. Second, fares should be regulated by maximum fares at least for the 
street market segments, perhaps allowing a two-tier system. However, one should be careful 
about drawing these conclusions from the above discussion. The market distortions in the taxi 
industry should be considered more thoroughly. Furthermore, the taxi industry is not one 
single market and different approaches may be warranted. Taxi services, in particular the 
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street segments, are also very similar to fresh goods markets with its implications for 
competition.  
 
Regulatory changes in the taxi industry should not be considered on the belief that taxi 
services are a homogeneous service. There are great differences between the different 
segments and the different local markets. The industry is different in urban areas as compared 
to rural areas. In some areas the industry has an important role in meeting basic mobility 
needs. The taxi industry is also becoming more important in providing public transportation 
services in the most rural areas. Regulatory changes may have implications for the possibility 
to do so.  
 
There are also other important aspects of the taxi industry that should be considered. One is 
the role of taxi dispatching centrals and the role of larger taxi companies. Taxi dispatching 
centrals are clearly underestimated as a factor for providing efficiency in the taxi industry. 
Efficient dispatching centrals may allow each taxi to provide more services and hereby 
reducing the idle time. Further, strong dispatching centrals or companies may create a better 
environment for fare comparisons and also provide a better opportunity for the authorities to 
control the industry. Hence, the role of dispatching centrals should be considered more 
thoroughly in relation to regulatory changes. 
  
A stepwise approach to deregulation seems to be more appropriate due to the unexpected 
effects caused by regulatory changes in the taxi industry. Such an approach allows monitoring 
and tailoring of the effects as changes occur and should improve the overall outcome. This is 
in particular evident from the Dutch experiences. 
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